As Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto smiled and exchanged words with Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and India’s Narendra Modi at the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the symbolism was striking.
Just days earlier, however, a different kind of message had arrived in Jakarta, one not of solidarity, but of warning. A formal letter from US President Donald Trump, dated July 7, 2025, informed President Prabowo that the United States would impose a 32% tariff on all Indonesian goods entering the US beginning August 1. The letter cited a long-standing trade deficit, Indonesian tariff and non-tariff barriers, and an imbalanced relationship.
It was blunt, unilateral, and delivered before Indonesia had made any aggressive pivot toward the BRICS alliance. This moment of Prabowo posing confidently with Global South leaders while facing pressure from the United States captures Indonesia’s geopolitical tightrope: a rising power looking for balance, but reminded that power asymmetries still bite hard.
Back in Indonesia, another event was unfolding. Brazilian climber Juliana Marins died on Mount Rinjani in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara. Brazilian authorities, citing negligence, signaled their intent to take legal action. “So much for the BRICS brotherhood,” one skeptical observer noted. At the same summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin was notably absent. Brazil, as a signatory of the Rome Statute, would have been legally obligated to arrest him due to an International Criminal Court warrant for his role in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. These stories, converging at the BRICS meeting, reveal how fragile this “alternative world order” truly is, riddled with contradiction, national interests, and legal constraints.
Indonesia’s BRICS membership reflects its ambition to diversify partnerships, amplify its global voice, and push back, gently but deliberately, against Western-dominated financial and geopolitical forums. Through institutions like the BRICS New Development Bank, Indonesia can explore funding and trade mechanisms without the conditionalities imposed by the IMF or World Bank. It’s a logical move for a country that has long championed global equity, non-alignment, and regional leadership. These aspirations align closely with Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine of bebas aktif (free and active), reaffirmed by Prabowo’s presence in Rio.
It is also encouraging to see President Prabowo voice Indonesia’s commitment to supporting Palestinian independence in such a high-profile forum. If BRICS is to be taken seriously as a counterweight to Western hypocrisy, Palestine should be a unifying cause, one of the clearest, longest-standing cases of occupation and injustice. Yet even on this supposedly common ground, BRICS reveals its fractures. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will not publicly support Palestine, as doing so would risk alienating his Hindu-nationalist base. This divergence illustrates how BRICS, while rhetorically united, is politically fragmented.
Still, Prabowo’s presence in BRICS has symbolic and strategic value. But symbolism alone doesn’t protect national interests, especially when the costs are already being imposed. President Trump’s letter is a wake-up call: the United States is prepared to punish even a neutral Indonesia, before it has taken any bold foreign policy steps. It reveals the asymmetry of Indonesia’s global positioning. Even when careful, Jakarta is vulnerable.
In response, President Prabowo would be wise to uphold Indonesia’s sovereignty while avoiding escalation. A carefully calibrated reply should reaffirm Indonesia’s commitment to a fair, rules-based trading system and welcome dialogue to resolve imbalances, but without yielding to threats. He could propose that both nations open immediate talks at the ministerial level, while reminding Washington that Indonesia, like any sovereign nation, has the right to diversify its partnerships. The tone must be respectful but firm: Indonesia values its long-standing relationship with the United States, but it cannot and will not accept unilateral economic pressure as the cost of asserting its independence on the world stage.
That’s precisely why BRICS, though not a replacement for existing alliances, must be used as leverage. If Indonesia is going to be punished anyway, it may as well expand its strategic toolkit. BRICS gives Indonesia another venue to negotiate trade, diversify investment, and signal that it has options. But BRICS must remain a bargaining chip, not the basket for all of Indonesia’s eggs.
Indonesia cannot afford to put all its eggs in the BRICS basket. The bloc remains institutionally weak. India and China are strategic rivals. Russia is diplomatically radioactive. Financially, the New Development Bank is still small and politically entangled. BRICS may offer opportunity, but it does not yet offer reliability.
More importantly, BRICS should never eclipse Indonesia’s deeper commitments, to ASEAN, the G20, APEC, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). These are the arenas where Indonesia holds real influence. ASEAN, in particular, demands enormous diplomatic investment, with dozens of meetings annually and a wide range of regional security, trade, and development frameworks. Indonesia cannot neglect these roles for a bloc still finding its identity.
The real danger is not BRICS itself, but over-identifying with it at the cost of balance. Indonesia’s power lies in its ability to engage all sides. As Vice President Mohammad Hatta said in 1948, Indonesia must learn to “row between two reefs.” That principle, bebas aktif, must guide Prabowo’s foreign policy as well. By remaining independent but assertive, Indonesia can maintain its diplomatic freedom while extracting benefits from multiple camps.
The Trump letter makes clear that the United States will act in its interests, regardless of Indonesia’s restraint or alignment. That reality justifies seeking new partnerships, but it also reinforces the need to tread carefully. A miscalculated pivot could trigger more severe economic or diplomatic fallout. What Indonesia needs is calibrated multilateralism, not bloc allegiance, but pragmatic pluralism.
This is why BRICS must be framed as an additional platform, not a substitute. It should complement, not compete with, Indonesia’s existing commitments. It should offer leverage, not identity. It should be tested through issue-based cooperation, not emotional declarations of South-South unity.
Equally troubling is the lack of national debate over Indonesia’s BRICS membership. There was no parliamentary session, no major media forum, and little civil society discussion. This contrasts with the open debate that accompanied Indonesia’s G20 presidency or its participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Without transparency, strategic coherence suffers.
Prabowo’s debut on the BRICS stage was a notable moment, but joining is only the beginning. Indonesia must now show that it can play multiple games at once: protecting national interests, balancing great powers, and maintaining regional leadership. BRICS should be used wisely, not idolized.
Indonesia’s seat at the BRICS table is secured. But that seat must not come at the expense of the room it helped build in ASEAN or the credibility it holds in the G20 and OIC. The United States has shown it will impose costs even without provocation. That alone justifies Indonesia’s search for balance and leverage. But it must remain true to its own doctrine: independent, active, and above all, sovereign in its choices.
Omong-Omong Media’s editorial is also published in The Jakarta Post every Monday.
