In her farewell speech in front of many Indonesian diplomats last Friday, former Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi could not hold back her tears, with many others in attendance joining her. They looked sad not so much because of her departure after ten years in the post, nor because they were afraid of the changes they were about to face. They probably cried—along with many Indonesians—because the ministry they serve and love will be led by an outsider, while Indonesian foreign policy risks falling into uncertainty as the new President Prabowo Subianto has appointed Sugiono, a former Army Lieutenant and his most trusted protégé, to replace Retno.
Just imagine for a minute: a former lieutenant, not even a colonel, let alone a general, will lead Indonesia in managing the rivalry between the United States and China in Southeast Asia, or mediating the complexities of South China Sea disputes. The last time the Indonesian foreign ministry, the country’s most capable and supposedly corruption-free state office, was led by a non-career diplomat was more than two decades ago; chaos reigned.
It’s not that under Retno as Indonesia’s chief diplomat the country achieved much in the international arena; rather, the foreign ministry possesses the country’s best pool of manpower—some even brighter than Retno herself—that could have been chosen to lead the ministry. Take, for instance, Arif Havas Oegroseno, Indonesia’s Ambassador to Germany. Nobody can deny his brilliance and his suitability for the ministerial role. He has been mentioned as a candidate for the ministerial position every time a new cabinet was formed in the last 15 years. However, Prabowo only appointed him as one of three vice ministers in the ministry. Havas, as we call him, is not only one of the best diplomats in the region—serving two ambassadorial posts and championing various important global and regional initiatives, especially in oceanic affairs and the law of the sea—but he is also a leading scholar in his field.
If an archipelagic Indonesia, which aspires to be a maritime powerhouse, needs an architect to create systems and regulations to enhance its capabilities and protect its maritime resources, then Havas is the man. Yet, now after being touted as foreign minister countless times, Havas must answer to someone with much lower knowledge, experience, and intellectual capacity than his own.
And Havas is hardly alone; the ministry is home to many hidden gems of brilliance. Diplomats like Dian Triansyah Djani, a special advisor to the minister, Ngurah Swajaya, Indonesia’s Ambassador to Switzerland, and Desra Percaya, Indonesia’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, are all more than capable of becoming a minister or vice minister. Ironically, Prabowo appointed Annis Matta, a politician without any experience in international relations or credible education in the matter, as another vice minister. So, just because Annis, the chairman of the small-time party Gelora, can speak a little Arabic and has a background as a Muslim politician concerned about Palestinian issues, he is deemed capable of representing Indonesia in tackling these complex matters? If not for Prabowo’s promise to provide Gelora Party some seats in the cabinet, Annis would not belong in the foreign ministry, let alone as a vice minister.
Indonesia’s pretension to play a meaningful role in the Palestinian issue can end up as mere stunts, cheap talk, and empty promises. Indonesia can never function as a legitimate peace broker mediating the two conflicting parties because, in its current condition, it would never acknowledge Israel, and consequently, Israel and the Western powers will never take Indonesia seriously. What Indonesia can do is condemn Israel while voicing support for Palestine, just as previous ministers have done. So, why do we even need Annis in the first place?
Prabowo’s Whitewashing Foreign Policy
Prabowo assigns Sugiono to lead the Foreign Ministry because he wants to control that ministry from the “smart ass” diplomats who could resist Indonesian diplomacy which focuses too much on managing international perceptions of the president. Prabowo, accused of serious human rights violations—including his role in Timor Leste and the alleged abduction of activists in 1998—will attempt to rewrite the narrative of his past through any means at his disposal.
It is not a coincidence that Yuril Ihza Mahendra, Prabowo’s Coordinating Minister for Law and Human Rights, dismissed the 1998 incidents, which include the killings of civilians and the abduction of many anti-Soeharto activists, as gross human rights abuses.
This complicates Indonesia’s potential roles in international arenas, as inexperienced Sugiono, whose background primarily involves political activities with his closest experience in foreign affairs being his membership in the House of Representatives’ Commission I, which deals with security and foreign affairs, may find himself needing to defend Prabowo’s past actions rather than promoting progressive foreign policies. The energy and resources directed at this defense could detract from Indonesia’s aspirations to assert itself as mediators or leaders in global conflicts.
Without such distractions, Indonesia can potentially regain its leadership role in Southeast Asia, taking its place as the first among equals (primus inter pares) within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With ongoing issues such as the Myanmar conflict and the South China Sea disputes, Indonesia under Prabowo with Sugiono as his chief diplomat could assert itself as a mediator and peace broker. However, this requires strategic diplomacy and the ability to bring all parties to the negotiating table, a challenging task for Sugiono, who is new to the diplomatic scene.
Secondly, with the increasing rivalry between the US and China, Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, finds itself in a delicate position. Sugiono will need to skillfully balance Indonesia’s relations between these superpowers while safeguarding national interests. This balancing act will test Indonesia’s non-aligned foreign policy and its ability to avoid being drawn into global power struggles.
Thirdly, as a politician, Sugiono’s foreign policy approach may be more influenced by domestic considerations and the political agenda of the ruling party. His success will depend on leveraging Indonesia’s geopolitical significance to secure economic and strategic benefits for the country. It remains to be seen whether this political lens will enhance or hinder Indonesia’s stature on the global stage.
Fourthly, during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s tenure, Indonesia was active in global multilateral organizations, promoting democracy and human rights. Sugiono’s challenge will be to revive this activism and meaningful participation, forging partnerships and initiatives that reaffirm Indonesia’s commitment to these values despite human rights abuse accusation against Prabowo.
Finally, with global economic uncertainties, Sugiono may prioritize economic diplomacy to attract foreign investment and boost trade. Building economic partnerships, especially within the Indo-Pacific region, could be pivotal for Indonesia’s growth and its international economic engagements.
While doubts are fast emerging over Sugiono’s capability to lead the ministry, his direct access to Prabowo and the possibility for the ministry, known for getting the lowest budget among the country’s state agencies, to get more money for its activities could prove vital if Indonesia’s diplomacy needs fast political backing and more funding.
Whether Sugiono proves to be an upgrade or a downgrade from Retno Marsudi will unfold in the coming months. However, the risks of inexperience and the need to manage Prabowo’s controversial image loom large, potentially limiting Indonesia’s aspirations and its voice on the world stage.