In the theatre of Indonesian politics, outrage has long been a recurring act. But the arrest of Deputy Minister of Manpower Immanuel “Noel” Ebenezer Gerungan by the country’s anti-graft commission is more than another headline in Jakarta’s scandal cycle. It is a vivid snapshot of the opportunism, impunity, and Machiavellian politics that define Indonesia’s bureaucracy, and an early test of President Prabowo Subianto’s commitment to eradicating corruption in the age of what he has christened serakahnomics, or “greed economics.”
That a man who in 2016 was a ride-hailing app driver could, within less than a decade, find himself in a deputy ministerial post, boasting a fleet of thirteen luxury vehicles and a multimillion-rupiah property portfolio, is not merely an anecdote of social mobility. It is a case study in political reward systems that continue to value loyalty over merit, proximity over principle, and transactional alliances over democratic accountability. Noel’s path, from campaign volunteer in President Joko Widodo’s camp to political turncoat backing Prabowo in 2024, illustrates the all-too-familiar choreography of personal advancement lubricated by political patronage.
But what makes this particular case more damning is the nature of the alleged crime. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) suspects Noel of extorting bribes from companies seeking occupational safety permits, an act that delays job creation, undermines industrial growth, and, at worst, risks the safety of workers whose lives may depend on a properly conducted inspection. Indonesia’s notoriously sluggish and opaque permitting process has long deterred investment. According to the World Bank’s now-discontinued Ease of Doing Business index, Indonesia ranked 73rd globally in 2020, behind Vietnam, Thailand, and even India. Much of that ranking reflected precisely the type of bureaucratic rent-seeking Noel is now accused of.
Corruption in Indonesia is not new. The country placed 115th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, a fall of 10 places from a decade earlier. The systemic nature of graft is so pervasive that it has become not just an impediment to governance but a structural feature of it. President Prabowo, to his credit, seems eager to brand himself as the man who will end this culture of impunity. He has declared war on what he terms serakahnomics—a portmanteau of serakah (greed) and economics—denouncing the hoarding of state resources by elites and the theft of public goods through cartel-like arrangements. In his first State of the Nation address, Prabowo cited some IDR 300 trillion (approximately US$18.5 billion) in savings recovered from waste and inefficiency in the national budget—mostly in travel, administration, and procurement costs.
Before Noel’s fall, there were other signs that Prabowo was reordering the political landscape with deliberate calculation. First came the presidential pardon of Hasto Kristiyanto, the Secretary-General of PDI-P and a longtime ally of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Once at the center of legal controversy, widely seen as a veiled attempt at political retaliation, Hasto’s sudden absolution sent a strong message of political détente. Soon after, Prabowo rehabilitated Thomas Trikasih Lembong, a Harvard-educated technocrat and former Investment Coordinating Board chief who had been marginalized during the latter years of Joko Widodo’s administration. Lembong’s reinstatement as a policy adviser marked a return to credibility and reformist appeal.
These were not acts of mercy, but maneuvers designed to signal a new centre of gravity in Indonesian politics. By pardoning a figure from Jokowi’s camp and restoring a sidelined reformist, Prabowo was claiming both moral authority and institutional continuity. The gestures burnished his image as a president capable of magnanimity and inclusion, inviting support from both disillusioned opposition members and centrists hoping for stability. In this light, the arrest of Noel did not appear as a mere outlier or isolated embarrassment but as part of a calculated sequence: first, embrace the legitimate; then sacrifice the expendable.
In a time when millions of Indonesians are struggling just to provide food on the table for their families, and jobs are difficult to find, what officials like Noel have done is not only a betrayal of the very task they are supposed to carry out. They are actively sabotaging job creation by delaying the opening of factories or construction projects. When they finally grant permits after receiving bribes, some alleging that Noel extracted hundreds of billions of rupiah, they do so without regard for proper inspection, placing worker safety at immense risk.
Noel’s alleged immorality and criminality are precisely what fuel Indonesia’s reputation as one of the world’s most corrupt environments to do business. It reinforces perceptions of low competitiveness, economic inefficiency, and high-cost business practices, driving away both domestic and foreign investors.
While credit must be given to Prabowo for permitting the arrest of a sitting deputy minister, and a member of his own Gerindra Party, without interference, politically, the moment lands on multiple levels. Noel may be the first cabinet member under Prabowo to fall to corruption charges, but he is also seen as a fringe figure more closely aligned with Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi’s son. His removal suggests a dual message: a warning to Prabowo’s own political circle, and a distancing move from his predecessor’s lingering influence.
First, after the Hasto pardon and Lembong’s political resurrection, Prabowo has positioned himself as a patron of both loyalists and former adversaries. It strengthens his case as a leader of unity, reform, and fairness, traits that will serve him well should he seek reelection in 2029, or perhaps more ominously, attempt constitutional changes to extend his term. Noel’s arrest fits into this pattern as a well-timed purge: remove a minor figure, draw public sympathy, and refocus attention on Prabowo’s supposed reformism.
Second, the timing conveniently distracts from the more dangerous and explosive demonstrations in Pati, where Sudewo, another Gerindra party official, became the face of local arrogance and corruption. The anger, which sparked nationwide protests, including in Bone, South Sulawesi, stemmed from budget cuts and forced regional tax hikes under Prabowo’s centralisation policy. With the Sudewo scandal threatening to swell, Noel’s arrest offered a politically useful redirection.
Third, it allows Prabowo to continue his slow but steady pivot away from Jokowi’s legacy. The former president’s star is dimming under the weight of ethical controversies and perceptions of dynastic politics. As the Prabowo administration distances itself from those still loyal to Jokowi, including Gibran’s camp, it seeks more compliant, less compromised allies for future electoral cycles.
Lastly, the move empowers the KPK, which had been widely regarded as weakened under Jokowi’s tenure, following legislative amendments in 2019 that clipped its independence and reduced its staffing authority. Prabowo’s decision to let the KPK pursue Noel may be a subtle but strategic bid to recapture the agency as part of his broader control of state apparatuses. The arrest also poses an indirect challenge to Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo, seen as one of Jokowi’s last institutional strongholds. Whether Prabowo will replace him before he retire in 2027 is an open question. The general is seen as instrumental in helping Prabowo secure the presidency, and may yet possess leverage that tempers such a move.
In any case, the Noel scandal helps both Prabowo and the KPK. The anti-graft body, often dismissed in recent years as toothless, has shown a hint of independence by targeting someone known to have benefited from Jokowi-era appointments. The commission’s credibility may now hinge on whether it continues to strike upward, or once again becomes a tool of the ruling class.
That said, symbolism matters. The fall of even a minor minister is not trivial. It emboldens whistle-blowers, energises anti-corruption officials, and reminds public servants, however briefly, that not everyone is untouchable. For an administration still shaping its legacy, the message may be as important as the act.
But Prabowo’s real test lies ahead. It is easy to remove fringe figures. It is harder to confront the embedded interests within his own political coalition, many of whom benefitted handsomely from the very economy of greed he now decries. If serakahnomics is to mean more than a rhetorical flourish, the next round of purges must reach deeper and strike harder.
For now, the arrest of Noel may be a drop in a very large and very dirty bucket. But it is a start. And in Indonesia’s long war against corruption, even small starts deserve attention, so long as they lead somewhere.
Omong-Omong Media’s editorial is also published in The Jakarta Post every Monday.
