It was a fine morning during the ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines, in January 2007. Then-Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stepped out of a meeting room and noticed Dino Patti Djalal, Indonesia’s presidential spokesperson and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s closest foreign policy advisor, walking nearby.
With casual familiarity, Lee called out, “Din, Dino!” prompting the Indonesian official to turn and respond warmly, “Yes, Mr. Prime Minister.” The two exchanged brief comments about scheduling and ongoing issues before going their separate ways. For a moment, I watched as a Jakarta Post journalist assigned to cover the summit, admiring the ease and respect with which a senior ASEAN leader engaged with an Indonesian official.
That short, seemingly insignificant exchange spoke volumes. It illustrated how, under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesian diplomats enjoyed deep respect from their regional counterparts. In fact, they were treated not just as colleagues but as equals, especially by leaders from neighboring countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. And that respect was hard-earned, particularly from a nation like Singapore.
Between 2004 and 2012, I covered Indonesia’s foreign affairs, foreign ministry as well as presidential office and SBY diplomacy intensively as a journalist. I witnessed, firsthand, the influence and seriousness with which Indonesia approached its regional and global engagements under SBY. At ASEAN meetings, Indonesia was seen as a thought leader. We were not merely present. We led. When Indonesia spoke, others listened. When Indonesia proposed, others considered and often followed. Leaders like Lee Hsien Loong were genuinely interested in Indonesia’s views because those views carried weight.
Even beyond the region, Indonesia held its ground on major global stages. During the Bali Climate Conference in December 2007, for example, the Indonesian delegation played a central role in pushing the United States to join the final agreement, despite strong initial resistance. It took days of grueling negotiations and sleepless nights, but in the end, the world gave President Yudhoyono a standing ovation as he approached the podium to deliver his concluding speech. That moment symbolized not only Indonesia’s success, but also its diplomatic prestige.
This commitment to proactive diplomacy was also tested closer to home during a major border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia in 2011. As tensions flared near the Preah Vihear temple, an ancient site claimed by both countries, Indonesia, serving as ASEAN Chair, took a bold and unprecedented step.
I still remember interviewing then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa that day. He had just returned from shuttle visits to Bangkok and Phnom Penh, looking visibly tired but determined. He was pioneering what became known as “shuttle diplomacy”, a creative, energetic approach to conflict resolution that had rarely, if ever, been used within ASEAN before.
“Shuttle diplomacy,” in this context, involved gathering information and trust from both sides by visiting them alternately, rather than bringing them together prematurely. But Indonesia didn’t stop there. We proposed a comprehensive “package solution” that included: formation of Joint Border Committee, a process of boundary demarcation, a ceasefire agreement, and the deployment of the Indonesian Observer Team (IOT) to monitor the situation on the ground
It was a bold departure from ASEAN’s long-standing tradition of strict non-interference in member states’ affairs. Indonesia didn’t force itself into the conflict. It was invited to help precisely because of its diplomatic credibility and leadership.
Was this, perhaps, our golden era in diplomacy?
Fast forward to 2025, and we are watching history repeat itself. Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia are resurfacing. This time, Indonesia is not the ASEAN Chair, Malaysia is. But President Prabowo Subianto has a unique opportunity to prove that Indonesia can still lead from within the region, even when it is not at the helm of the organization.
So far, however, the Indonesian response has been stunningly muted. Neither Foreign Minister Sugiono nor President Prabowo has issued any public statement on the conflict. The silence is just puzzling. At a time when ASEAN unity is fragile and the region is hungry for stable leadership, Indonesia is absent.
If Prabowo genuinely wants to play a significant role on the global stage, he must first earn the confidence of his regional peers. The Thai-Cambodia conflict offers a litmus test. Can Indonesia contribute constructively and credibly to regional peace, without overshadowing Malaysia’s chairmanship? Can we offer ideas, mediation, and support that reflect the region’s shared interests?
To do that, Prabowo must first look inward. He needs a wise and competent team around him. Foreign policy is not a playground for political appointees. Appointing loyalists with little background in diplomacy to key foreign policy positions will only damage Indonesia’s credibility.
The danger of weak diplomatic management has already begun to show—on a global stage, no less. Recently, President Prabowo was forced to intervene personally and speak directly with former US President Donald Trump after his administration failed to properly manage negotiations over Trump-era trade tariffs on Indonesian exports. What should have been a technical negotiation handled by professionals turned into a last-minute, top-level plea. With no strategic leverage left, Prabowo had to beg for tariff relief, essentially asking for leniency from a man known for transactional bullying. The result? Indonesia was humiliated into offering concessions and receiving a lower tariff, still punitive, but painted as a diplomatic “success” back home.
This episode stands in sharp contrast to SBY’s era. During SBY’s leadership, even tough negotiations with Washington were handled with poise and planning. We didn’t grovel. We negotiated. And when we stood our ground, we did so with credibility and allies.
This is where the contrast becomes painful. During the 2007 climate negotiations, Indonesia’s diplomatic corps was a force. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda led the effort, supported by Ambassador Marty Natalegawa, flown in from London, and a highly competent team of directors from the ministry. They weren’t just loyal. They were experienced, brilliant, and well-connected.
Today, signs of dysfunction are emerging. Roy Soemirat, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, has been appointed as ambassador to Iran but no replacement has been named. So he remains the de facto spokesperson while preparing for his new post. He is still the one responding to inquiries on the Thai-Cambodia conflict. This isn’t sustainable. And it may be a reflection of Foreign Minister Sugiono’s lack of experience and internal familiarity. As a political appointee, he may not yet know the institution he is supposed to lead.
Foreign policy is not a campaign. It’s a craft. It requires institutional memory, networks, credibility, and composure. If Prabowo wants to revive Indonesia’s leadership role, he must surround himself with capable hands. The world, especially our region, won’t wait for him to learn on the job.
Indonesia’s success in 2011, bringing Thailand and Cambodia to the table, crafting a neutral solution, and maintaining ASEAN unity, did not happen by accident. It was the result of vision, preparation, and political will. President Yudhoyono empowered his diplomats to act decisively and backed them with moral and political support.
President Prabowo now faces a similar opportunity. But he must resist the temptation to personalize diplomacy or politicize appointments. Instead, he should learn from SBY: trust professionals, value diplomacy, and let Indonesia once again be the respected, leading voice in Southeast Asia.
Only then can we walk into ASEAN rooms and global forums, not just to be seen, but to lead.
